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This paper considers the simple problem of abduction in the framework of Bayes theorem, when the prior probability of
the hypothesis is not available, either because there are no statistical data to rely on, or simply because a human expert is
reluctant to provide a subjective assessment of this prior probability. This abduction problem remains an open issue since a
simple sensitivity analysis on the value of the unknown prior yields empty results. This paper tries to propose some criteria
a solution to this problem should satisfy. It then surveys and comments on various existing or new solutions to this prob-
lem: the use of likelihood functions (as in classical statistics), the use of information principles like maximum entropy,
Shapley value, maximum likelihood. Finally, we present a novel maximum likelihood solution by making use of condi-
tional event theory. The formal setting includes de Finetti’s coherence approach, which does not exclude conditioning
on contingent events with zero probability.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Abductive reasoning tries to ﬁnd plausible explanations for observed evidence. In the framework of prob-
ability theory, Bayes theorem may help solving the problem, provided that enough information is available,
which is, however, rarely the case. To put the basic problem of Bayesian abduction in more formal terms,
assume H to be a Boolean proposition interpreted as a hypothesis, a disease, a fault, a cause, etc. pertaining
to the state of a system. Let E be another proposition representing a hypothetically observed (that is, obser-
vable) fact, a symptom, an alarm, an eﬀect, etc. Numerical assessments of positive conditional probability val-
ues P(E|H) = a and P(E|Hc) = b 6 a are supplied by an agent, who either uses available statistical data or
proposes purely subjective assessments. The problem is to evaluate the relative plausibility of the hypothesis
and its negation after observing event E. If a prior probability P(H) is assigned and b > 0, then the question is0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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observation E is made, or that probabilities a or b are set to zero. What can be said about the support given
to hypotheses H vs. Hc upon observing E? For instance, a roadwork (H) might cause a traﬃc jam (E). Having
assigned all necessary probabilities above and being stuck in a traﬃc jam, with which probability do we expect
a roadwork ahead, i.e. how to estimate P(HjE) in a reasonable way?
In this work, we thoroughly discuss past proposals for dealing with this problem and develop either new
solutions or rigorous formalization of previously proposed solutions. To this aim, we review various
approaches to probability theory, and to imprecise probabilities, such as maximum entropy, Shapley value,
conditional events, de Finetti’s coherence setting, possibility theory and the like, and include an in-depth com-
parison. As a main contribution of this paper, we present a novel maximum likelihood approach by making
use of conditional event theory, viewing conditional probabilities as a kind of midvalues. Although we might
want to deal with more complex abduction problems, investigating these methods in this simple context
already helps clarifying substantial diﬀerences between them.
Here, by deﬁnition, we do not take for granted the Bayesian credo according to which whatever their state
of knowledge, rational agents should produce a prior probability. Indeed the idea that point probability func-
tions should be in one to one correspondence with belief states means that a probability degree is equated to a
degree of belief. Then, in case of total ignorance about H, agents should assign equal probabilities to H and its
complement, due to symmetry arguments. This claim can be challenged, and has been challenged by many
scholars (e.g. [33,15,37,39]): Indeed agents must assign equal probabilities toH and its complement, when they
know that the occurrence of H is driven by a genuine random process, and when they know nothing. The two
epistemic states are diﬀerent but result in the same probability assessment. Here, we take ignorance about H
for granted, assuming P(H) is unspeciﬁed (in other words the agent refuses to bet on H. We review what was
done in the past, and what can legitimately be done to cope with ignorance, trying to formally justify various
solutions to this problem.
Investigating the problem of abduction in a formal Bayesian framework here allows us to deal both with
consistency based diagnosis (i.e. when evidence contradicts some hypotheses made about a system) and purely
abductive reasoning (i.e. ﬁnding a minimal set of faults that explain the observations) in a common
framework.
This paper is organized as follows: We put the problem into formal terms in the next section, and some
criteria are laid bare for a solution to the problem to be acceptable. We continue by recalling three classical
approaches for its solution. Afterwards, various information principles are applied to solve the problem, and
compared with each other. Finally, we present our novel relaxed maximum likelihood approach. We conclude
the paper with a summary and an outlook on further work.
2. Methodology
In this paper, the following notations are adopted: X is the sure event, AB is short for A ^ B (conjunction),
and the complement of an event A is denoted Ac. Moreover, we use the same symbol to denote an event and its
indicator.
2.1. Formalizing the problem
The basic variables in the problem are denotedx ¼ P ðEHÞ; y ¼ P ðEcHÞ; z ¼ P ðEHcÞ; t ¼ P ðEcHcÞ:LetP ¼ fP ; P ðEjHÞ ¼ a; P ðEjHcÞ ¼ bg be the set of probability functions described by the constraints express-
ing the available knowledge. The variables x; y; z; t are thus linked by the following constraints:xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1 ðnormalizationÞ;
x ¼ aðxþ yÞ corresponding to PðEjHÞ ¼ a;
z ¼ bðzþ tÞ corresponding to P ðEjHcÞ ¼ b:
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by many authors working on imprecise probabilities; see e.g. [8,9,14,17,28,31,24,38]. The set P is clearly a seg-
ment on a straight line in a four-dimensional space ðx; y; z; tÞ, namely, the intersection of the hyperplanes with
equations xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1, x ¼ aðxþ yÞ and z ¼ bðzþ tÞ:
In the most general case, assuming 0 < a, b < 1, the constraints can be written1 Assy ¼ 1 a
a
x; z ¼ b
1 b t;
x
a
þ z
b
¼ 1;or equivalentlyx ¼ a
1 b ð1 b tÞ; y ¼
1 a
1 b ð1 b tÞ;
z ¼ b
1 b t; 0 6 t 6 1 b:Then, the set P is the segment bounded by the probabilities ða; 1 a; 0; 0Þ and ð0; 0; b; 1 bÞ. It can be
checked that this result still holds when a = b = 1: In this particular case, the constraintsx ¼ aðxþ yÞ; z ¼ bðzþ tÞ; xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1;
become x ¼ xþ y; z ¼ zþ t; xþ z ¼ 1. Then, the set P is the segment bounded by the probabilities ð1; 0; 0; 0Þ
and ð0; 0; 1; 0Þ. We also note that, as it could be easily veriﬁed, the initial assessment
P ðE j HÞ ¼ a; P ðE j HcÞ ¼ b is coherent in the sense of de Finetti [22] for every a 2 ½0; 1; b 2 ½0; 1. The con-
sistency of conditional probability assessments can be checked by a geometrical approach (see Appendix A),
or considering suitable sequences of probability functions (see e.g. [13]). Hence, the constraints are always
satisﬁable.
Note that P(EjH), P(EjHc) often reﬂects generic knowledge (sometimes interpreted causally) expressing the
probabilities of observing events of the form E when H occurs or when its contrary occurs, respectively. Then
these probabilities refer to a population of situations where the occurrence of events of the form E was
checked when H was present or absent. This population may be explicitly known (as in statistics) or not
(for instance we know that birds ﬂy but the concerned population of birds is ill-deﬁned). On the contrary,
the observation E is contingent, it pertains to the current situation, and nothing is then assumed on the prob-
ability of occurrence of events of the form E in the population. In this case, it is not legitimate to interpret the
observation E as a (new) constraint P(E) = 1, which would mean that events of the form E are always the case,
while we just want to represent the fact that event E has been observed now.1
Suppose the prior probability P(H) is provided by an agent. Clearly it must be interpreted in a generic way
(in general, events of the form H have this propensity to be present); otherwise, if P(H) were only the contin-
gent belief of the agent now, one may not be able to use it on the same grounds as the conditional probabilities
so as to uniquely deﬁne a probability function in P (since we do not interpret the contingent but sure obser-
vation E as having probability 1). As a consequence, when the prior probability P(H) is speciﬁed, our generic
knowledge also includes the posterior probability P(HjE), which we extract for the reference class E (as we
know the current situation is in the class of situations where E is true). In a second (inductive) step, the value
P(HjE) can be used by the agents for measuring their belief in the hypothesisH to be present now, given that E
is observed.
A common, but fallacious objection to the above remark can be as follows: suppose that the agent inter-
prets P(EjH), P(EjHc) as contingent conditional belief degrees of observing E if H is present or not present in
the current situation. In that case, since these values are interpreted as contingent uncertain beliefs, one may be
tempted to interpret the observation of evidence in a strong way, as P(E) = 1, especially in the case where the
prior probability of H is unknown. Unfortunately, the equality P(E) = 1 is inconsistent with P(EjH) = a and
P(EjHc) = b since they imply aP P(E)P b. So the formal framework cannot support the interpretation of
P(EjH), P(EjHc) as contingent conditional belief degrees, unless we interpret conditioning as probability revi-
sion [41].uming P(E) = 1 is often done in probability kinematics [41], where conditioning is understood as revising a probability function.
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The following conditions could be considered as minimal prerequisites for an abduction method to qualify
as being reasonable:
(1) The formal model should be faithful to the available information: it should not select a unique probabilistic
model if there is no reason for it. The assignment of a unique probabilistic prior in the situation of igno-
rance can be seen as a useful suggestion to apply Bayes theorem. But it then should be justiﬁed in some
reasonable way.
(2) The solution should be non-trivial: the approach should not result in total ignorance, when
P(EjH)5 P(EjHc), since likelihood functions do express information. The fundamental Polya abductive
pattern in the logical setting, whereby if H implies E and E is true then H becomes plausible should be
retrieved.
(3) The chosen approach should always provide a solution: it should not lead to a logical contradiction, since
likelihood functions are consistent with any prior probability, and the case where the prior probability is
assigned is one of maximal information.
(4) The method should be principled: there should be a formal framework that can support the inference
results of the abduction process, no ad hoc solution is searched for.
(5) The solution should be intuitive and plausible: the method should not yield an unreasonable result that
commonsense would obviously dismiss.
In the following we ﬁrst check if past proposals to the problem satisfy these requirements.3. Three standard approaches
In the literature, three approaches exist that try to cope with ignorance of the prior probability. The ﬁrst
approach is based on varying the prior probability on the expression of P(HjE) derived from Bayes theorem.
Unfortunately the posterior probability remains totally unknown in this case, even if some zero probabilities
prevent the standard approach from being carried out, as shown in the second approach, using de Finetti’s
coherence framework [22]. Another classical approach in non-Bayesian statistics relies on the relative values
of P(EjH) and P(EjHc) being interpreted as the likelihood of H and its complement. In this approach, the idea
of computing a posterior probability is given up. The only way of ascertaining a hypothesis under this
approach is by rejecting its complement. It turns out that this approach is consistent with possibility theory
[19].
In the following, we recall these approaches in some detail.3.1. Imprecise Bayes
The most obvious thing to do in the absence of prior is to perform sensitivity analysis on Bayes theorem.
Let P(H) = p be an unknown parameter. ThenP ðH jEÞ ¼ P ðEjHÞ  P ðHÞ
P ðEÞ ¼
a  p
a  p þ b  ð1 pÞ :But the value p is anywhere between 0 and 1. Clearly the corresponding range of P(HjE) is [0,1]. So this ap-
proach brings no information on the plausibility of the hypothesis, making the observation of evidence and
the presence of the generic knowledge useless, in contradiction with requirements 2 and 5. Indeed, one feels
prone to consider that evidence E should conﬁrm H if for instance a is high and b is low. The above analysis
presupposes a  p þ b  ð1 pÞ 6¼ 0.
Two cases result in a  p þ b  ð1 pÞ ¼ 0. First the case when P ðE j HcÞ ¼ b ¼ 0 and P(H) = p = 0 (the case
when P(EjH) = a = 0 implies b = 0 by construction); ﬁnally the case when a = b = 0, while p > 0.
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(so that P(E) = 0); what can be said about P(HjE)? It can be proved that P(HjE) 2 [0,1]. We observe that
P(EjHc) = 0 implies z = 0 ; P(H) = 0 implies x + y = 0. So, t = 1. Since the only constraint acting on
P(HjE) is x = P(HjE)(x + z), the latter just reduces to 0 = P(HjE) Æ 0, so P(HjE) is unconstrained.
Now, what can be said if we assume P(EjH) = P(EjHc) = 0, so that P(E) = 0, without assuming P(H) = 0?
It implies x = z = 0 so that t + y = 1. Then since by deﬁnition x = P(HjE)(x + z), it all reduces to
0 = P(HjE) Æ 0 again. So, the range of P(HjE) still remains [0,1].
However, we cannot fully rely on the above approach in the case when some probabilities are zero. Suppose
for instance the assessment P ðH jE _ HÞ ¼ 1
2
were added to the two current ones. It can be shown that the
assessment P(HjE) = p1, P(HjE _ H) = p2 is coherent if and only if p1 6 p2. If there are no zero probabilities,
this is obvious since we know that P(HjE) 6 P(HjE _ H). The conclusion 0 6 P ðH jEÞ 6 1
2
is then obvious. But
ifP ðEjHÞ ¼ a > 0; PðEjHcÞ ¼ 0; P ðHÞ ¼ 0; P ðH jE _ HÞ ¼ 1
2which implies P ðEÞ ¼ PðHÞ ¼ P ðE _ HÞ ¼ 0, it follows x ¼ y ¼ z ¼ 0; t ¼ 1; then the assessments above, and
P(HjE) = c, lead to the constraintsx ¼ aðxþ yÞ; z ¼ 0ðzþ tÞ; xþ y ¼ 0;
xþ y ¼ 1
2
ðxþ y þ zÞ; x ¼ cðxþ zÞ;that is0 ¼ a  0; 0 ¼ 0  1; x ¼ y ¼ 0; 0 ¼ 1
2
 0; 0 ¼ c  0:Hence, there is no way to obtain P ðH j EÞ 6 1
2
since this system only implies 0 6 c 6 1. Only by using a general
methodology, such as the coherence-based approach of de Finetti, may we be sure of properly handling all
(explicit or implicit) constraints.
3.2. Coherence approach
The coherence setting of de Finetti [22] allows a sound handling of zero probabilities of conditioning events.
In fact, zero probabilities on relevant relationships might occur easily in practice. For instance, Bernard [3]
referred to a statistical investigation on the religious behaviour of people, in which no individuals were present
that pray often, while not going to church regularly nor giving their children any religious education. Never-
theless, one might be interested in elaborating relationships between the event E = pray_often ^ regu-
lar_church ^ religious_education and the event H= Believing_in_paradise, also studied in that
investigation. If the expert directly evaluates probabilities by observed frequencies, she obtains
P(EH) = P(EHc) = 0 and so are P(EjH) and P(EjHc). Then the conditional probability P(HjE) is the indeter-
minate form 0
0
; hence a diﬃculty. Now suppose that some expert assesses the probabilities P(EjH) and P(EjHc),
based on some general information. These assessments would not depend on the fact that in some data col-
lection experiment, the frequencies of relevant events are zero. In general, not excluding zero probabilities is
often needed for hypothetical or counterfactual reasoning. However, the problem of zero probabilities could
arise again, for instance in the (extreme) case in which the expert asserts P(H) = P(EjHc) = 0. In such cases,
direct reasoning as in the previous subsection in general may fail, as shown above.
So, our abduction problem must be treated in the coherence framework of de Finetti to make sure results
we found in the zero probability cases are correct. Theoretical details on this approach are given in Appendix
A. Two cases must be considered: P(H) = b = 0, and P(H) > 0, a = b = 0. We analyze the ﬁrst pathological
case. The second pathological case can be analyzed by similar reasoning. So consider the problem:P ðEjHÞ ¼ a > 0; PðEjHcÞ ¼ 0; P ðHÞ ¼ 0:
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F ¼ ðEjH ;EjHc;H jX;H jEÞ:To check coherence of p, as a ﬁrst step we have to consider the ‘‘constituents’’ (interpretations) generated by
F and contained in the disjunction of the conditioning events H _ Hc _ X _ E = X (here, the sure event),
which areC1 ¼ EH ; C2 ¼ EcH ; C3 ¼ EHc; C4 ¼ EcHc;
(in the case we are examining, the complement C0 of the disjunction of the conditioning events is not a con-
stituent, as it coincides with the impossible event ;). LetE1jH 1 ¼ EjH ; E2jH 2 ¼ EjHc; E3jH 3 ¼ H jX; E4jH 4 ¼ H jE:
To each basic constituent Ch assign a vector Qh ¼ ðqh1; qh2; qh3; qh4Þ, where, for each conditional indexed by
j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4, component qhj is deﬁned as in Eq. (A.3) in Appendix A. Namely
• h ¼ 1 : C1 ¼ EH  E1H 1;E3H 3;E4H 4;
• h ¼ 2 : C2 ¼ EcH  E3H 3;Hc4;
• h ¼ 3 : C3 ¼ EHc  Hc1;E2H 2;
• h ¼ 4 : C4 ¼ EcHc  Hc1;Hc4:
Then, in geometrical terms, we get the pointsQ1 ¼ ð1; 0; 1; 1Þ; Q2 ¼ ð0; 0; 1; cÞ; Q3 ¼ ða; 1; 0; 0Þ; Q4 ¼ ða; 0; 0; cÞ;and, denoting by I the convex hull of Q1; . . . ;Q4, we check the (necessary) coherence condition p 2 I, that is
the existence of a non-negative vector ðx; y; z; tÞ such thatp ¼ xQ1 þ yQ2 þ zQ3 þ tQ4; xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1:
This comes down to writing exactly the system of equations deﬁning the set of probabilities P in Section 2.1.
Of course, the consistency of this system is in general necessary but not suﬃcient for the coherence of p; it
becomes suﬃcient when, like in the previous subsection, we exclude conditioning events of zero probability.
In our pathological case the system becomes:x ¼ aðxþ yÞ; z ¼ 0; xþ y ¼ 0; x ¼ cðxþ zÞ;
xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1; xP 0; y P 0; zP 0; tP 0: ð1ÞAs p = Q4, the condition p 2 I is satisﬁed (i.e., the system is solvable), with x ¼ y ¼ z ¼ 0; t ¼ 1, for every
c 2 ½0; 1. Notice that the solution of the above system, ðx; y; z; tÞ ¼ ð0; 0; 0; 1Þ, is a probability function on
the set of constituents fC1;C2;C3;C4g. With this probability function are associated, for the conditioning
events H ;Hc;X;E, the following probabilitiesPðHÞ ¼ xþ y ¼ 0; P ðHcÞ ¼ zþ t ¼ 1;
PðXÞ ¼ xþ    þ t ¼ 1; P ðEÞ ¼ xþ z ¼ 0:Then, we must continue to check coherence on the sub-family of conditional events whose conditioning events
have zero probability; that is, we have to check as a second step the coherence of the assessment p0 = (a,c) to
F0 ¼ ðEjH ;H jEÞ. Constituents in H _ E are C1 ¼ EH ; C2 ¼ EcH ; C3 ¼ EHc, with associated points:
Q1 ¼ ð1; 1Þ; Q2 ¼ ð0; cÞ; Q3 ¼ ða; 0Þ (in the case we are examining, the disjunction of the conditioning events
is H _ E, so that m = 3 and C0 ¼ ðH _ EÞc ¼ HcEc). As we can verify, the condition p0 2 I0 holds, that isp0 ¼ xQ1 þ yQ2 þ zQ3; xþ y þ z ¼ 1;
xP 0; y P 0; zP 0;
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xþ y þ z ¼ 1; xP 0; y P 0; zP 0; ð2Þsolvable withx ¼ ac
aþ cð1 aÞ ; y ¼
ð1 aÞc
aþ cð1 aÞ ; z ¼
að1 cÞ
aþ cð1 aÞ ;for every c 2 [0, 1].
Notice that the vector ðx; y; z; tÞ ¼

ac
aþcð1aÞ;
ð1aÞc
aþcð1aÞ;
að1cÞ
aþcð1aÞ; 0

is a probability function on the set of constit-
uents fC1;C2;C3;C0g, where C0 ¼ EcHc. With this probability function, the following probabilities are asso-
ciated with the conditioning events H,E:P ðHÞ ¼ xþ y ¼ c
aþ cð1 aÞP 0;
P ðEÞ ¼ xþ z ¼ a
aþ cð1 aÞ > 0:As the set of conditioning events with zero probability is empty or equal to {H}, the assessment p0 = (a,c) is
coherent for every c 2 [0,1]; therefore, the initial assessment p = (a, 0,0,c) is coherent for every c 2 [0,1]. In
other words, the range of P(HjE) remains [0,1].
We observe that in the above checking of coherence we used the following sequence of two probability
functions:P 0 ¼ ð0; 0; 0; 1Þ; P 1 ¼ acaþ cð1 aÞ ;
ð1 aÞc
aþ cð1 aÞ ;
að1 cÞ
aþ cð1 aÞ ; 0
 
:We remark that: (i) at the second step the study is restricted to the sub-familyF0 ¼ fEjH ;H jEg; (ii) the prob-
abilities of the constituents not contained in (the disjunction of conditioning events) E _ H are equal to zero;
in fact, the variable t, associated with (E _ H)c = EcHc, is zero. Using the notion of zero-layer (see [13]), with
the above probability functions the following holds: If c > 0, Hc (and of course X) belongs to the most normal
zero-layer with level 0, while at the second zero-layer with level 1 are E and H; if c = 0, Hc (and X) is in the
zero-layer of level 0, E is at level 1, and the zero-layer of H is at level 2.
As shown above, diﬀerently from what happens in the usual approach to probabilistic reasoning, in the
more general setting of coherence (where conditioning events are allowed to have zero probability) the admis-
sibility of a given probability assessment on a family of conditional events amounts to the existence of (in gen-
eral inﬁnite) sequences of probability distributions deﬁned on the relevant context (set of constituents). In fact,
the machinery of coherence has the ‘‘minimal’’ aim of determining the set of all admissible probability assess-
ments, without specifying a particular status for any of them. The choice of a particular assessment in such set
mainly depends on how the expert weighs his information. In other words, coherence is a syntactic (not
semantic) tool and, like with imprecise probabilities, it does not suggest a particular way of solving the abduc-
tion problem for P(HjE).
3.3. Likelihood approach
Non-Bayesian statisticians (e.g. [20,1]) consider P(EjH) to be the likelihood of H, denoted by L(H). When
P(EjH) = 1, H is only fully plausible. When it is 0 (the probability P(EjHc) being positive) it rules out hypoth-
esis H upon observing E. But there is no formal justiﬁcation given to the notion of likelihood, usually, thus
violating requirement 4. We are in a dilemma as the sensitivity approach is probabilistically founded but pro-
vides no information while the likelihood approach is informative but looks ad hoc in a probabilistic setting.
Note that the likelihood approach is also in agreement with a default Bayesian approach: in the absence
of a prior probability, assume it is uniformly distributed. Then the posterior probability is P ðH j EÞ ¼ aaþb, so
that it is equivalent to renormalize the likelihood functions in the probabilistic style. This fact has been
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Even if the likelihood approach looks consistent with the uniform prior (Bayes) method, the former has no
pretence to compute precise posterior probabilities: results it provides are informative only if one of a or b is
small (and not the other). Saying that the likelihood approach is a special case of the Bayesian approach is
like saying that an unknown probability distribution and a uniform probability distribution mean the same
thing.
Dubois et al. [18] suggested that L(H) can be viewed as an upper probability bound and also a degree of
possibility: generally the quantity P(AjB) is upper bounded by maxx2BP(Ajx), and as pointed out by [13], if
set-function L is assumed to be inclusion-monotonic (as expected if we take it for granted that L means like-
lihood), then P(AjB) = maxx2BP(Ajx) is the only possible choice if only P(Ajx) is known for all x.
In this sense the likelihood approach, common in non-Bayesian statistics, comes down to interpreting
conditional probabilities in terms of possibility theory [19]. The quantity P(EjH) can be used to eliminate
assumptionH if it is small enough in front of P(EjHc), but evaluating that P(EjH) = 1 is not suﬃcient to ascer-
tain H.4. Relying on information principles
One way out of the dilemma of abduction without priors is to introduce additional information by means
of default assumptions that are part of the implicit background knowledge. The idea is that in the absence of
prior probability, one ﬁnds a (default) probability measure in P in some way, relying on principles of infor-
mation faithfulness, maximal independence assumptions, or symmetry assumptions, respectively [32]. Then
the posterior beliefs of agents are dictated by the default probability thus selected. Unfortunately, as seen
below the results obtained by means of the various principles are not fully consistent with each other.4.1. The maximum likelihood principle
The maximum likelihood principle says that if an event occurred then this is because it was at the moment
the most likely event. So the best probabilistic model in a given situation is the one which maximizes the prob-
ability of occurrence of the observed evidence. This principle is often used to pick a probability distribution in
agreement with some data. For instance, assume we observe k heads and n  k tails from tossing a coin n
times. The probability function underlying the process is completely determined by the probability of heads,
say x. To ﬁnd the best value of x, one maximizes the likelihood L(x) = P(Ejx) = xk Æ (1  x)nk, where E= ‘‘k
heads and n  k tails’’ and we ﬁnd x ¼ kn. Interestingly, since x completely deﬁnes the probability measure P on
{tail, head}, P(Ejx) = L(P), i.e. the likelihood of model P.
So, the maximum likelihood approach selects a plausible probabilistic model, with a view to solve the
abduction problem in a second step. In our problem, we interpret P(E) as the likelihood of the probability
function P after E occurred. In our case, E occurred, so it is legitimate to establish the agent’s posterior (con-
tingent) belief about H assuming P(E) is as large as possible under the constraints P(EjH) = a < 1 and
P(EjHc) = b 6 a. Again, in that case we interpret P(E) as the likelihood of the probability function P to be
selected among those such that P(EjH) = a,P(EjHc) = b, while the non-Bayesian statistics approach directly
chooses between H and Hc on the basis of their likelihoods. Here we ﬁrst try to select a plausible probabilistic
model, and then, solve the abduction problem.
Note that P(E) = a Æ p + b Æ (1  p) whose maximum is P(E) = a, which unfortunately enforces p = 1. It
comes down to assuming P(H) = 1, so that P(HjE) = 1, too. This is clearly too strong to be credible, even
under a weak interpretation of the posterior probability (H is present in the situation where E was observed).
However note that in this approach the constraint P(E) = a is not added to mean that the probability of E is
indeed a in the population. It just assumes that the population of realizations relevant for the current situation
is the one where E is as likely as possible, so that in the current situation, P can be restricted to
fP 2 P; P ðEÞ is maximalg.
In any case, this approach violates requirement 5, as being counterintuitive. A way out of this diﬃculty will
be proposed later on in this paper, as the relaxed maximum likelihood approach.
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A fairly popular informational principle is the maximization of entropy (e.g. [32]). Entropy quantiﬁes the
indeterminateness inherent to a probability distribution P by HðP Þ ¼ PxP ðxÞ log PðxÞ. Given a set
R ¼ fðB1jA1Þ½x1; . . . ; ðBnjAnÞ½xng of probabilistic conditionals, the principle of maximum entropymaxHðQÞ ¼ 
X
x
QðxÞ logQðxÞ
s:t: Q is a distribution satisfying Rsolves (uniquely) the problem of representing R by a probability distribution without adding information
unnecessarily. The resulting distribution is denoted by MEðRÞ. The maximum entropy solution is often inter-
preted as a least committed probability, i.e. the one involving maximal indeterminateness in a subsequent deci-
sion process. In fact, maximum entropy processes conditional dependencies especially faithfully, and
independence between events is implemented only if no information to the contrary can be derived. We will
recall very brieﬂy some facts on the principle of maximum entropy that are needed to solve the problem con-
sidered here; for further details, maximum entropy distribution, see e.g. [29].
Using well-known Lagrange techniques, we may represent MEðRÞ in the form
MEðRÞðxÞ ¼ k0
Y
i:xAiBi
a1xii
Y
i:xAiBci
axii ð3Þwith the ai’s being exponentials of the Lagrange multipliers, one for each conditional inR, and k0 simply arises
as a normalizing factor.
The maximum entropy solution to our problem can be computed as follows. Let Pme be the maxent distri-
bution in P and we use the notation a ¼ a
1a; b ¼ b1b. Here, the probabilistic information given is represented
by R ¼ fðEjHÞ½a; ðEjHcÞ½bg, so Pme ¼ MEðRÞ. Let kþa ¼ a1a; ka ¼ aa; kþb ¼ b1b; kb ¼ bb with a normal-
izing constant k0 = (a
a(1  a)1 + bb (1  b)1)1. Using Eq. (3) we get the following probabilities:
Now, it immediately follows thatPmeðH jEÞ ¼ a
1a
a1a þ b1b ¼
a  aað1 aÞa1
a  aað1 aÞa1 þ b  bbð1 bÞb1 ;andPmeðHÞ ¼ k0ðkþa þ ka Þ ¼
aað1 aÞa1
aað1 aÞa1 þ bbð1 bÞb1 :Furthermore, also the maxent probability of E can be calculated, and it turns out that this probability is ob-
tained by ME-fusing the given probabilities a and b (in the sense of [30]):PmeðEÞ ¼ k0ðkþa þ kþb Þ ¼
a1að1 aÞa1 þ b1bð1 bÞb1
aað1 aÞa1 þ bbð1 bÞb1 : ð4ÞRemark. A more elementary approach, only good for the particular problem at hand, is as follows. Every
probability in P has the form
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where k = P(H), and its entropy amounts toH ¼HðkÞ ¼ ka logka kð1 aÞ logkð1 aÞ ð1 kÞb logð1 kÞbð1 kÞð1 bÞ logð1 kÞð1 bÞ
¼ k logkð1 kÞ logð1 kÞ ka loga kð1 aÞ logð1 aÞ ð1 kÞb logbð1 kÞð1 bÞ logð1 bÞ:The principle of maximum entropy selects the unique probability distribution Pme with maximum entropy in
P: so let us compute the value of k where the derivativedH
dk
¼ ðlog k  logð1 kÞ þ a log aþ ð1 aÞ logð1 aÞ  b log b ð1 bÞ logð1 bÞÞvanishes. Solving dH
dk ¼ 0 for k yieldsk
1 k ¼
bbð1 bÞ1b
aað1 aÞ1a ;which is equivalent tok ¼ b
bð1 bÞ1b
aað1 aÞ1a þ bbð1 bÞ1b ¼
aað1 aÞa1
aað1 aÞa1 þ bbð1 bÞb1 :With that k, we obtain, as expected,PmeðH jEÞ ¼ kakaþ ð1 kÞb ¼
a1að1 aÞa1
a1að1 aÞa1 þ b1bð1 bÞb1 :Example 1. We will study the example from the introduction in this framework, considering a roadwork as a
possible explanation for a traﬃc jam. Here E = traﬃc jam, H = roadwork, and we assume P(EjH) = 0.9,
P(EjHc) = 0.2. Using the formal machinery from above, the maximum entropy probability Pme(HjE) turns
out to be 0.791. Therefore, roadwork appears to be a suitable explanation for the traﬃc jam.4.3. Shapley value as pignistic probability
The Shapley value was ﬁrst proposed in cooperative game theory [34], to extract from a set of weighted
coalitions of agents (a non-additive set-function), an assessment of the individual power of each agent (a prob-
ability distribution).
The Shapley value is deﬁned as follows. Consider the lower probability function induced by the set P, i.e.,
8A  Xð¼ fE;Ecg  fH ;HcgÞ P ðAÞ ¼ inffPðAÞ; P 2 Pg. For each permutation r of elements of X, a proba-
bility distribution pr can be generated from P*, letting, for i ¼ 2; . . . ; n,prðxrðiÞÞ ¼ P ðfxrð1Þ; . . . ;xrðiÞgÞ  P ðfxrð1Þ; . . . ;xrði1ÞgÞ:
The Shapley value is the average of these n! (possibly identical) probability distributions, and it can be written,
if x 2 X,pShðxÞ ¼
s!ðn s 1Þ!
n!
X
SX;x 62S
ðP ðS [ fxgÞ  P ðSÞÞ;where s and n are cardinalities of S and X, respectively.
For convex capacities, it is the center of mass of the set P (which then coincides with set of probability
functions {PP P*}[35]). In the theory of belief functions, it is known as the ‘‘pignistic transformation’’ [37].
Selecting the Shapley value comes down to assuming that all probabilities in P are equally probable so that
by symmetry the center of mass of this polyhedron can be chosen by default as the best representative prob-
ability function in this set. This is similar as replacing a solid by its center of mass for studying its kinematics.
As shown above, P is a segment on a straight line, bounded by the probabilities ða; 1 a; 0; 0Þ and
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this segment, i.e. ða
2
; 1a
2
; b
2
; 1b
2
Þ. Under this default probability,P ShðH j EÞ ¼ aaþ b
that is, the Shapley value supplies the same response as the Bayesian approach where a uniform prior is as-
sumed! This is not too surprising as the Shapley value can be seen as assuming a uniform metaprobability over
the probability set induced by the constraints, and considering the average probability resulting from this
meta-assessment. The above result suggests that assigning a uniform prior to assumptions and assuming a uni-
form metaprobability over the probability polygon come down to the same result.
Example 2. We consider Example 1 in the Shapley framework. Here, we ﬁnd easily PSh(HjE) = 0.818. The
result is similar to that calculated by the maximum entropy approach.4.4. Comparative discussion
Contrary to the simple form, in some sense natural, of the Shapley value, the maximum entropy solution
looks hard to interpret in the problem at hand, at ﬁrst glance. But there is a similarity of form between them,
except that the maxent solution distorts the inﬂuences of the probabilities a and b by the functionf ðxÞ ¼ x
1 x
 1xso that the maxent solution for P(HjE) takes the same form as the Shapley value, after distortion, namely,
f ðaÞ
f ðaÞþf ðbÞ. Alternatively, one may see the maxent solution as deﬁning a default prior, assuming P ðHÞ ¼
wðaÞ
wðaÞþwðbÞ depending on coeﬃcients a and b, where wðxÞ ¼ xxð1 xÞx1, so that P(HjE) takes the form awðaÞawðaÞþbwðbÞ.
Note that logw(x) is the entropy of the probability distribution ðx; 1 xÞ. So w(x) is all the higher as the
distance between x and 0.5 is smaller. So the prior probability selected by the maxent approach basically
reﬂects the relative proximity from P(EjH) to 0.5, and P(EjHc) to 0.5, regardless of their being greater or less
than 0.5. For instance the cases where a = b = 0.9, a = b = 0.1 and where a = 0.9, b = 0.1 yield the same
default prior probabilities. The value of weighting function w is not altered by exchanging a and 1  a
(and b and 1  b); w(x) takes on values in [1,2] so that P(H) lies in the interval ½1
3
; 2
3
 with Pme(H) = 0.5 if
and only if a = b or a = 1  b. In other words, this weighting function shrinks the [0,1] range of prior prob-
abilities symmetrically around 0.5. This makes maximum entropy more cautious, i.e. returning in general
probabilities which are closer to 0.5, according to the maxent philosophy of not introducing determinateness
unnecessarily. In the Shapley approach, PSh(H) = 0.5 is an invariant, independent of a and b.
As a and b approach the extreme probabilities 1 resp. 0, the maxent solution approaches the Shapley value.
In fact, we have PSh(HjE) = Pme(HjE) if and only if a = b, or a = 1  b. In the ﬁrst case, H and E are statis-
tically independent, in the second case, the inﬂuence of H on E is symmetrical – its presence makes E probable
to the same extent as its absence makes it improbable, which can be understood as a generalization of logical
equivalence to the probabilistic case. This reﬂects a strong symmetric dependence between E and H. What
makes Shapley value bolder in the scope of maxent is that both approaches coincide only when E and H
are either independent, or very strongly related. In fact, a (the degree of the presence of H) has a positive eﬀect
throughout on the probability PSh(HjE) whereas b (the degree of the absence of H) has a negative eﬀect. This
means that increasing a or decreasing b always results in an increase of PSh(HjE) which can be explained, e.g.,
by assuming H to be an essential cause of E.
As opposed to this, the maximum entropy probability processes information in a more unbiased way, i.e.
without assuming either strong dependence or independence in general. But note, that when such a relation-
ship seems plausible (in the cases a = b or a = 1  b), then it coincides with the Shapley value.
A general comparison between the inference process based on center of mass propagation (resulting in the
Shapley value) and that by applying the maxent principle was made in [32]. Paris showed that center of mass
inference violates some properties that reasonable probabilistic inference processes should obey. More pre-
cisely, in general, center of mass inference can not deal appropriately with irrelevant information and with
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seems to be as good a candidate for reasonable inference as the maximum entropy value, regarding invariance
with respect to irrelevant evidence.
Overall, it seems that the maximum entropy approach is syntactically similar to both the Shapley approach
(since there exists similar implicit default priors in both approaches) and the maximum likelihood approach
(posterior probabilities are proportional to likelihoods or some function thereof) for solving the abduction
problem.
However, the particular form of the maximum entropy solution is hard to interpret in the problem at hand.
So, requirement 5 is met better by the Shapley value than by the maximum entropy solution. As to the other
requirements, these two approaches are quite similar: Both always provide a solution, rely on formal frame-
works and are non-trivial (requirements 2, 3, and 4). Since they pick unique probability distributions for solv-
ing the problem, both methods violate requirement 1 in a strict sense, although one might argue that they do
so for good reasons.
5. A relaxed maximum likelihood approach
The reason why the maximum likelihood fails is that maximizing P(E) on P enforces P(H) = 1. It may
mean that the available knowledge is too rigidly modelled as precise conditional probability values.
As pointed out in [21], the symbol EjH stands as a three-valued entity, not a Boolean one as it distinguishes
between examples EH, counterexamples EcH and irrelevant situations Hc. Authors like [27,16] have claimed
that EjH can be identiﬁed with the pair (EH,EH _ Hc) of events (an interval in the Boolean algebra), or with
the triple (EH,EcH,Hc) that forms a partition of the universal set. And indeed (provided that P(H) > 0)
P(EjH) is a function of P(EH) and P(E _ Hc); namelyP ðEjHÞ ¼ PðEHÞ
P ðEHÞ þ 1 P ðE _ HcÞ :If P(H) = 0, i.e., PðEHÞ ¼ 0; P ðE _ HcÞ ¼ 1, it can be veriﬁed that the assessment ð0; 1; zÞ on
fEH ;E _ Hc;E j Hg is coherent for every z 2 [0,1]. Moreover, under minimal positivity conditions [27],
P(AjB) 6 P(CjD) "P if and only if AB  CD and A _ Bc  C _ Dc (or, equivalently, AB  CD and
CcD  AcB).
Now, it is important to realize that EjH is a kind of mid-term between EH and E _ Hc since
P(E _ Hc)P P(EjH)P P(EH). So it makes sense to interpret the conditional knowledge as P(E _ Hc)P
aP P(EH) and P(E _ H)P bP P(EHc), respectively. This is consistent with the original data due to the
above remarks, which also show that the new formulation is a relaxation of the previous one.
According to the maximum likelihood principle, the default probability function should now be chosen
such that P(E) = x + z is maximal, under constraints:P ðE _ HcÞP aP P ðEHÞ; P ðE _ HÞP bP P ðEHcÞ
and we assume here a positive likelihood function aP b > 0. The problem then reads:maximize xþ z such that 1 y P aP x; 1P xþ y þ zP bP z:
Since aP x, bP z, xþ z 6 aþ b, the maximal value of P(E) is P ðEÞ ¼ minð1; aþ bÞ.
Now there may be more than one probability measure maximizing P(E). In order to compute the posterior
probability, P(HjE), we are led to the problem of maximizing and minimizing P(EH) = x subject to1 y P aP x; 1P xþ y þ zP bP z; xþ z ¼ minð1; aþ bÞ:Proposition 1. Under the conditional event approach, assuming a positive likelihood function P ðE j HcÞ ¼
b 6 a ¼ P ðE j HÞ, for the maximum likelihood posterior probability, P(HjE), we have
(1) if a + bP 1 then P ðH j EÞ 2 ½1 b; a.
(2) P ðH jEÞ ¼ aaþb, otherwise.
D. Dubois et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 47 (2008) 333–351 345Proof. When a + bP 1 then x + z = 1, then y = 0 is enforced. Hence the constraints of the problem reduce
to:aP x; bP 1 x:
Then x ¼ P ðEHÞ ¼ P ðH j EÞ 2 ½1 b; a. If a + b < 1, then P ðEÞ ¼ xþ z ¼ aþ b. From this and aP x, bP z,
it follows directly, that x = a, z = b must hold, which yields P ðH jEÞ ¼ xxþz ¼ aaþb. h
Example 3. Studying our running Example 1 in this framework is easily done. For the hypothesis roadwork,
we have a + bP 1, so it is straightforward to see that here, P(roadworkjtraffic jam) 2 [0.8,0.9].
Framing the problem within the setting of the de Finetti coherence approach encompasses the case of zero
probabilities. Given two quantities a and b in the interval [0,1], we assign the unspeciﬁed quantities
p ¼ ðx; z; a; b; c; pÞ to the vector of conditional events ðEH ;EHc;E _ Hc;E _ H ;E;H j EÞ, where EH = EHjX,
and so on. We want to obtain all the coherent values of p under the constraints P(E _ Hc)P aP P(EH),
P(E _ H)P bP P(EHc) and the condition that c is maximum. Then, we obtain the following proposition,
that takes into account all cases.
Proposition 2. In the framework of coherence, the maximum likelihood posterior probability, P(HjE), is only
known to lie in the interval [p 0, p00] such that:
(1) if a ¼ b ¼ 0; then p0 ¼ 0; p00 ¼ 1;
(2) if a > 0; b ¼ 0; then p0 ¼ p00 ¼ 1;
(3) if a > 0; b > 0; aþ bP 1; then p0 ¼ 1 b; p00 ¼ a;
(4) a > 0; b > 0; aþ b < 1; then p0 ¼ p00 ¼ aaþb.Proof. To check the coherence of p we use again the constituents C1 ¼ EH ;C2 ¼ EcH ;C3 ¼ EHc;C4 ¼ EcHc,
and the associated six-dimensional points Q1; . . . ;Q4. For example, Q1 ¼ ð1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1Þ, and so on. Then, at
the ﬁrst step we check the condition p 2 I, which amounts to the solvability of the following system (in the
unknowns x; y; z; t, with non negative parameters a; b; c; p)a ¼ xþ zþ t; b ¼ xþ y þ z; c ¼ xþ z; x ¼ pðxþ zÞ;
xþ y þ zþ t ¼ 1; xP 0; y P 0; zP 0; tP 0;subject to maximize (x + z) when x 6 a 6 xþ zþ t; z 6 b 6 xþ y þ z. Now, let us consider the diﬀerent
cases:
Case 1. a = b = 0; in this case x = z = max(x + z) = 0; then, the system becomesa ¼ t; b ¼ y; c ¼ 0; 0 ¼ p  0;
y þ t ¼ 1; x ¼ 0; y P 0; z ¼ 0; tP 0;and, of course, is solvable for every p 2 ½0; 1; hence the range of P ðH j EÞ is ½p0; p00 ¼ ½0; 1.
Case 2. a > 0, b = 0; in this case z ¼ 0; maxðxþ zÞ ¼ max x ¼ a and the system can be written asa ¼ aþ t; b ¼ aþ y; c ¼ a; a ¼ p  a;
xþ y þ t ¼ 1; x ¼ a; y P 0; z ¼ 0; tP 0:Of course, the system is solvable if and only if p = 1, so P ðH j EÞ ¼ p0 ¼ p00 ¼ 1.
Case 3. a > 0; b > 0; aþ bP 1; in this case maxðxþ zÞ ¼ 1; y ¼ t ¼ 0 and the system becomesa ¼ 1; b ¼ 1; c ¼ 1; x ¼ p;
xþ z ¼ 1; 0 6 x 6 a; y ¼ 0; 0 6 z ¼ 1 x 6 b; t ¼ 0:Then, the system is solvable for every 1 b 6 p ¼ x 6 a, so that the range of P ðH j EÞ is ½p0; p00 ¼ ½1 b; a.
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a ¼ aþ bþ t; b ¼ aþ bþ y;
c ¼ aþ b; a ¼ pðaþ bÞ;
aþ bþ y þ t ¼ 1; x ¼ a; y P 0; z ¼ b; tP 0:Then, the system is solvable if and only if p ¼ aaþb, so that P ðH j EÞ ¼ p0 ¼ p00 ¼ aaþb. h
While conﬁrming the results of the previous proposition, the coherence approach solves three additional
cases with zero probabilities. When a = 0 and b5 0 or when a5 0 and b = 0, one of the assumptions H
or its contrary are eliminated. When a = b, we get either P ðH jEÞ ¼ P ðHcjEÞ ¼ 1
2
if a 2 ð0; 1
2
Þ; equal upper prob-
abilities a onH and its contrary if a > 1/2; we also get the same result (upper probabilities 1, that is, total igno-
rance) for both a = b = 0 and for a = b = 1.
These results are not so surprising, even if new to our knowledge. This approach, in opposition to the ones
in the previous section does not necessarily enforce a default prior. When P(EjH) and P(EjHc) are large, we
only ﬁnd upper probabilities P*(HjE) = a and P*(HcjE) = b (since the lower probability P*(HjE) = 1  b),
which is in agreement with the interpretation of the likelihoods L(H) = P(EjH) and L(Hc) = P(EjHc) as
degrees of possibility (or upper probabilities). The larger they are the less information is available on the prob-
lem. In particular when a = b = 1, the likelihood function is a uniform possibility distribution on {H,Hc} that
provides no information (indeed P(EjH) = P(EjHc) = 1 means that both H and Hc are possible). It is natural
that the observation E should not inform at all about H in this case, that is, it is intuitively satisfying that
PðH j EÞ 2 ½0; 1 (total ignorance) even assuming P(E) = 1. If a = b both increase from 0.5 to 1, our knowledge
on the posterior evolves from equal probabilities on the hypothesis and its contrary to higher order uncer-
tainty about them, ending up with total ignorance.
On the contrary, when P(EjH) and P(EjHc) are small, the maximum likelihood solution in this case is a
unique probability P ðH jEÞ ¼ aaþb. This is the result obtained by the Bayesian approach under uniform priors
and by the Shapley value of the probability sets induced by the likelihood functions. In this case the available
knowledge, under maximum likelihood assumption, is rich enough to provide much information upon observ-
ing evidence, under the maximum likelihood principle.
When P(EjHc) is much smaller than P(EjH), the maximum likelihood principle enables hypothesis Hc to be
eliminated. It supplies a unique probability measure proportional to (a,b) if both values are small enough.
This new approach to handling abduction without priors has some advantages. It reconciliates the maxi-
mum likelihood principle (that failed due to an overconstrained problem) and the ad hoc likelihood-based
inference of non-Bayesian statistics. But it also recovers the Shapley value and the Bayesian approach with
a uniform prior in some situations. It conﬁrms the possibilistic behavior of likelihood functions, being all
the more uninformative as the likelihood of the hypothesis and of its complement are both close to 1. When
they are both low but positive, the Bayesian approach with a uniform prior is recovered. When one of a and b
is zero, then the hypothesis with zero likelihood is unsurprisingly disqualiﬁed by observing E. However, in the
case when both likelihoods are zero or one, it results in total ignorance about the posterior probability of the
hypothesis. So even if it is in partial agreement with some of the other techniques, this new approach is, in its
spirit, also at odds with the maximum entropy method, with Shapley value and the uniform Bayes approach as
well, all of which treat the cases a = b < 0.5 and a = b > 0.5 likewise.
The relaxed maximum likelihood approach is similarly well-behaved as Shapley value and maximum
entropy, but it avoids sticking to the idea of selecting a unique probabilistic model. So, it satisﬁes all of
our requirements, though it is not axiomatized, as Shapley value or the maximum entropy solution are.
But it follows the maximum likelihood principle, as opposed to the simple ad hoc use of likelihood functions.6. Conclusion
One of the traditional disputes in probability theory opposes the Bayesian approach whereby any state of
knowledge can be characterized by a single probability function on the suitable space, and classical statistics
where likelihood functions are often empirically estimated but subjective prior probabilities are not considered
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tion, but the price paid is, as already stressed in the past, that either a full data collection is needed or a debat-
able representation of ignorance in the form of prior probabilities must be adopted. The classical statistics
approach may look as lacking formal foundations despite the existing rationales for this pragmatic approach.
This paper has tried to put together many tools proposed in additive and non-additive probability theories so
as to sort out the issue of unknown priors.
Several approaches to the problem of probabilistic abduction have been reviewed, and some novel solutions
have been proposed, based on maximum entropy, Shapley value and maximum likelihood reasoning. This
study suggests that the key issue is a suitable representation of the available probabilistic knowledge, and a
suitable choice of a reasoning principle. Table 1 summarizes the performance of the considered approaches
with respect to the criteria 1, 2, 4, 5 laid bare in the methodology section. As a result of this paper, some light
is shed on the classical statistics approach and the maximum likelihood principle, by casting them in the
framework of possibility and imprecise probability theories. The paper also shows the noticeable agreement
between the use of Shapley value and the classical Bayesian assumption of uniform priors under ignorance.
The maximum entropy approach is shown to signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the Bayesian tradition of uniform priors
and the non-Bayesian approach based on likelihoods. Indeed, the selected P(H) depends on the relative dis-
tance between the likelihoods of H and Hc and 0.5. The farther P(EjH) to 0.5 compared to P(EjHc) the more
informative H turns out to be. Only the maximum likelihood bluntly applied when likelihoods are known
leads to a contradiction (criterion 3). Our new maximum likelihood approach under a relaxed interpretation
of the causal knowledge provides an original solution to the probabilistic abduction problem that bridges the
gap between the straightforward use of likelihood functions and the assumption of a uniform prior, being
more informative than the pure sensitivity analysis approach but less precise than the Bayesian, Shapley
and maxent solutions when the likelihoods are too high to enable any hypothesis rejection.
It could be interesting to develop the work made in this paper by applying the relaxed maximum likelihood
approach to more general knowledge bases, and also for notions of coherence other than coherent inference. In
particular, the case of multiple-valued universes for hypotheses and pieces of evidence is worth investigating.
More work is also needed to fully interpret the obtained results. In particular, a systematic comparative
study of ﬁrst principles underlying the Shapley value and the maximum entropy approach is certainly in order.
We should also compare our results with what the imprecise probability school [39] and the Transferable
Belief Model [36] have to say about this problem in a more careful way. The problem discussed in this paper
is indeed closely connected with the issue of statistical inference with binomial data, when little knowledge
about prior uncertainty is available. In the standard statistical literature, the so-called ‘objective Bayesian
approach’ (starting with works by Jeﬀreys) is devoted to the search of alleged uninformative priors. More
recently, the imprecise Dirichlet model of Walley (see a survey paper by Bernard [2] and Utkin and Augustin
[38]) deals with how to infer information about the parameter x ruling a binomial experiment, given some
observations (modelled by likelihood functions L(x) as in Section 4.1) and prior information given under
the form of a set of priors each having the form of a beta distribution. It is clearly related with our concerns
here, since it includes the case when all possible beta priors are allowed. Here we do not assume any prior at
all. Moreover Bernard’s paper also recalls a set of principles that statistical inference without prior informa-
tion should obey (symmetry, representation invariance, dependence on likelihood function, and coherence in
the sense of Walley), that complement and reﬁne the more general criteria discussed here.Table 1
Comparison of diﬀerent approaches
Method Faithfull Non-trivial Principled Plausible
Uniform Bayes No Yes Yes Yes
Imprecise Bayes Yes No Yes No
Likelihood reasoning Yes Yes Usually no Yes
Maximum likelihood No No Yes No
Maximum entropy No Yes Yes Debatable
Laplace–Shapley No Yes Yes Yes
Relaxed maximum likelihood Yes Yes Yes Yes
348 D. Dubois et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 47 (2008) 333–351Moreover, another point to study is the inﬂuence of irrelevant information on the results of the various
approaches. Finally, in order to evaluate the cognitive plausibility (see requirement 5) of the diﬀerent
approaches more thoroughly, psychological testing could be carried out with experts.Acknowledgments
We thank the referees for their useful suggestions and comments.Appendix A. Coherent conditional probability assessments
We recall basic results on the handling of linear equations in checking coherence of conditional probability
assessments stemming from conditional probability assessments, as pioneered by de Finetti (see e.g. [5,10–
13,22,25,26,40]). Given an arbitrary family of conditional events K and a real function P :K! R, let us
consider a sub-family F ¼ fE1jH 1; . . . ;EnjHng K, and the vector p ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ, where pi ¼ P ðEi j
HiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. We denote by Hn the disjunction H 1 _    _ Hn. Notice that, as EiHi _ Eci H i_
Hci ¼ X; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, by expanding the expression
Vn
i¼1ðEiHi _ Eci H i _ Hci Þ, we can represent X as the disjunc-
tion of 3n logical conjunctions, some of which may be impossible. The remaining ones are the constituents
generated by the family F. We denote by C1; . . . ;Cm the constituents contained in Hn and (if Hn 6¼ X) by
C0 the further constituent H
c
n ¼ Hc1   Hcn, so that Hn ¼ C1 _    _ Cm;X ¼Hcn _Hn ¼ C0 _ C1 _   
_Cm; mþ 1 6 3n.
Coherence with betting scheme: Using the same symbols for the events and their indicators, with the pair
ðF; p) we associate the random gainG ¼
Xn
i¼1
siHiðEi  piÞ;where s1; . . . ; sn are n arbitrary real numbers. Let gh be the value of G when Ch is true. Of course g0 = 0 (notice
that g0 will play no role in the deﬁnition of coherence). We denote by GjHn the restriction of G toHn; hence
GjHn 2 fg1; . . . ; gmg;minGjHn ¼ minfg1; . . . ; gmg; maxGjHn ¼ maxfg1; . . . ; gmg.
Then, the function P deﬁned onK is said coherent if and only if, for every integer n, for every ﬁnite sub-
family F K and for every s1; . . . ; sn, one hasminGjHn 6 0 6 maxGjHn; ðA:1Þor equivalentlymaxGjHn P 0 ðminGjHn 6 0Þ: ðA:2ÞCoherence with penalty criterion: de Finetti [22] has proposed another operational deﬁnition of probabilities,
which can be extended to conditional events [25]. With the pair ðF; p) we associate the loss
L ¼Pni¼1HiðEi  piÞ2; we denote by Lh the value of L if Ch is true. If You specify the assessment p on F
as representing your belief’s degrees, You are required to pay a penalty Lh when Ch is true. Then, the function
P is said coherent if and only if do not exist an integer n, a ﬁnite sub-family F K, and an assessment
p ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ on F such that, for the loss L ¼
Pn
i¼1HiðEi  pi Þ2; associated with ðF; pÞ, it results
L 6L and L 6¼L; that is Lh 6 Lh; h ¼ 1; . . . ;m, with Lh < Lh in at least one case.
Notice that the betting scheme and the penalty criterion are equivalent [25]; this means that a probability
assessment p is coherent under the betting scheme if and only if it is coherent under the penalty criterion.
If P is coherent, then it is called a conditional probability onK. Notice that, if P is coherent, then P satisﬁes
all the well known properties of conditional probabilities (while the converse is not true; see [26, Example 8];
or [13, Example 13]).
We can develop a geometrical approach to coherence by associating, with each constituent Ch contained in
Hn, a point Qh ¼ ðqh1; . . . ; qhnÞ, where
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1 if Ch  EjHj;
0 if Ch  EcjHj;
pj if Ch  Hcj :
8><
>: ðA:3ÞDenoting by I the convex hull of the points Q1; . . . ;Qm, based on the penalty criterion, the following result
can be proved ([25])
Theorem 1. The function P is coherent if and only if, for every finite sub-family F K, one has p 2 I.
Notice that, if F ¼ fE j Hg, p = (P(EjH)) = (p), we havep 2 I()
p ¼ 0; EH ¼ ;;
p ¼ 1; EH ¼ H ;
p 2 ½0; 1; ; 	 EH 	 H :
8><
>:Then, by Theorem 1, it immediately follows
Corollary 3. A probability assignment P(EjH) = p is coherent iff it holds that
p ¼ 0; EH ¼ ;;
p ¼ 1; EH ¼ H ;
p 2 ½0; 1; ; 	 EH 	 H :
8><
>:The betting scheme and the penalty criterion are equivalent, due to the following results:
(i) the condition p 2 I amounts to solvability of the following system ðSÞ in the unknowns k1; . . . ; kmPm
h¼1
qhjkh ¼ pj; j ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
Pm
h¼1
kh ¼ 1; kh P 0; h ¼ 1; . . . ;m:
8>><
>>:(ii) let x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xmÞ; y ¼ ðy1; . . . ; ynÞt and A = (aij) be, respectively, a row m  vector, a column n  vector
and a m · n  matrix. The vector x is said semipositive if xi P 0 8i; and x1 þ    þ xm > 0. Then, we have (cf.
[23, Theorem 2.9]).
Theorem 2. Exactly one of the following alternatives holds.
(i) the equation xA = 0 has a semipositive solution;
(ii) the inequality Ay > 0 has a solution.
We observe that, choosing aij = qij  pj "i, j, the solvability of xA = 0 means that p 2 I, while the solvability of
Ay > 0 means that, choosing si = yi "i, one has minGjHn > 0 (and hence p would be incoherent). Therefore,
applying Theorem 2 with A = (qij  pj), we obtain maxGjHn P 0 iff ðSÞ is solvable, that is, maxGjHn P 0
iff p 2 I.
Checking coherence. It could seem that, in order to verify coherence, we should check the condition p 2 I for
every F K (which tends to become intractable).
We show that this is not the case, by restricting the attention to the checking of coherence of the assessment
p on F. Let S be the set of solutions K ¼ ðk1; . . . ; kmÞ of the system ðSÞ. Then, deﬁne UjðKÞ ¼
Uðk1; . . . ; kmÞ ¼
P
r:CrHjkr; j ¼ 1; . . . ; n; Mj ¼ maxUjðKÞ; j ¼ 1; . . . ; n; I0 ¼ fj 2 J : Mj ¼ 0g. Notice that
I0 is a strict subset of f1; . . . ; ng. We denote by ðF0; p0Þ the pair associated with I0.
Given the pair ðF; pÞ and a subset J 	 f1; . . . ; ng, we deﬁne HJ ¼
W
j2JHj.
Moreover, we denote by ðFJ ; pJ Þ the pair associated with J and by ðSJÞ the corresponding system.
We observe that ðSJ Þ is solvable if and only if pJ 2 IJ , whereIJ is the convex hull associated with the pair
ðFJ ; pJ Þ. Then, it can be proved:
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f1; . . . ; ng. If there exists a solution ðk1; . . . ; kmÞ of ðSÞ such that
P
r:CrHJ kr > 0, then ðSJ Þ is solvable, i.e.
pJ 2 IJ .
Theorem 4. Given the assessment p onF, assume that ðSÞ is solvable, i.e. p 2 I. Then, for every J 	 f1; . . . ; ng
such that JnI05 ;, one has pJ 2 IJ .
By the previous results, we obtain:p coherent () p 2 I;
if I0 6¼ ;; then p0 is coherent:
Then, we can check coherence by the following procedure:
Algorithm 1. Let the pair ðF; pÞ be given
(1) Construct the system (S) and check its solvability.
(2) If the system (S) is not solvable, then p is not coherent and the procedure stops, otherwise compute the
set I0.
(3) If I0 = ;, then p is coherent and the procedure stops; otherwise set ðF; pÞ ¼ ðF0; p0Þ and repeat steps
1–3.Notice that similar results and methods can be used for checking generalized coherence and for propaga-
tion of imprecise conditional probability assessments (cf. [26]). The coherence-based approach to probabilistic
reasoning with imprecise probabilities has been studied in many papers (see [4,5,13,39,40]). In particular, mod-
elling uncertainty by conditional probability bounds, the relationship between coherence-based probabilistic
reasoning and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning has been examined in [6]. In [7], among other things, a
complete study of the complexity of coherence-based probabilistic reasoning has been made.
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